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Abstract—Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages
the ubiquity of sensor-equipped mobile devices to collect data. To
achieve good quality for crowd sensing, incentive mechanisms are
indispensable to attract more participants. Most of existing mech-
anisms focus on the expected utility prior to sensing, ignoring
the risk of low quality solution and privacy leakage. Traditional
incentive mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. In this
paper, to address these challenges, we propose a behavior based
incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applications with budget
constraints by applying sequential all-pay auctions in mobile
social networks (MSNs), not only to consider the effects of
extensive user participation, but also to maximize high quality
of sensing data submission for the platform (crowd sensing
organizer) under the budget constraints, where users arrive
in a sequential order. Through an extensive simulation, results
indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework
outperform existing solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing ubiquity of sensor-embedded mobile
devices (e.g., smartphones), mobile social networks (MSNs),
which integrate data collection techniques and services into
many kinds of social networks [1], [2], have received con-
siderable research efforts in recent years due to two changes
as follows. First, the terminal devices for social network
applications change from PCs to mobile phones. Second,
the interactive mode extends from the virtual space to the
real physical world. MSNs provide a new opportunity for
crowd sensing, which takes advantage of the pervasive mobile
devices to solve complex sensing tasks. A typical example
of crowd sensing applications is to provide the support for
green traffic by sensing and reporting timely the measurements
about traffic flows in some region. Different from existing
crowdsourcing systems, crowd sensing exploits sensing and
processing abilities of mobile devices to provide sensing data
from the real physical world towards a specific goal or as part
of a social or technical experiment [3], [4].
Extensive user participation and submission quality are two
crucial factors determining whether crowd sensing applications
in MSNs can achieve good service quality. Most of the current
crowd sensing applications are based on a common hypothesis
that all users voluntarily participate in submitting the sensing
data. However, mobile devices are controlled by rational
users, in order to conserve energy, storage and computing
resources, so selfish users could be reluctant to participate
in sensing data for crowd sensing applications. Thus, it is
indispensable to provide some incentive schemes to stimulate
selfish participants to cooperate in MSNs. Only a handful of
works [5]–[8] focus on incentive mechanism for crowd sensing
applications. All of these works apply a regular auction (e.g.,
a reverse auction) only for off-line crowd sensing applications
with the ex-ante payment commonly known as “Free rider
problem”.
The data submission quality issue from participants is also
challenging in crowd sensing applications [9]. If the submis-
sion quality of participants is not well guaranteed, although
the extensive user participation offers useful information, the
service quality from participants is far from satisfactory to the
requesters of crowd sensing applications. For example, on the
one hand, the limit of the coverage constraint may make the
participants with high quality data drop out of crowd sensing
application [8]; On the other hand, traditional incentive mech-
anisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
1 and its variants also will make the participants with higher
true valuation become starved frequently to win, thereby drop
out of crowd sensing applications [10]. Therefore, special
mechanisms must be included to handle these challenges.
Although both extensive user participation and submission
quality issues have been identified as two crucial human
factors for crowd sensing applications, many recent research
works [5]–[12] tend to separately study them in crowd sensing
applications. The reason is that, if the extensive user partici-
pation and submission quality problems are addressed at the
same time for crowd sensing applications, the issue would
become more challenging. For example, some submission
quality enhanced techniques [11], [12] stimulate participants
to generate high quality sensing contents to achieve good
service quality, but they could make some incentive strategies,
especially the reputation-based incentive strategies under bud-
get constraints, hard to implement extensive user participation
coverage constraints for crowd sensing applications, since
it is not practical to assume that the requester will always
provide an unlimited budget to achieve good service quality.
Therefore, how to simultaneously address both extensive user
participation and submission quality issues becomes particu-
larly challenging for crowd sensing applications with budget
constraints.
In this paper, to address the fore-mentioned challenges, we
1Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid auction, where bidders submit
written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction, and
in which the highest bidder wins, “but the price paid is the second-highest
bid.”
propose a behavior based incentive mechanism for practical
crowd sensing applications with budget constraints. Specif-
ically speaking, our main contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We explore a behavior based incentive mechanism for
crowd sensing applications with budget constraints in
MSNs. In order to simultaneously satisfy the require-
ments of both extensive user participation and high
quality sensing data submission, we combine the all-
pay auction theory and a proportional share allocation
rule to stimulate the participants to generate high efforts
and adequate coverage constraints to achieve the better
service for the requester of crowd sensing applications
with budget constraints.
• We focus on a more real crowd sensing scenario where
users arrive one by one online in a random order. We
model the issue as a sequential all-pay auction 2, in which
sensing data are submitted sequentially and the users
with the high quality sensing data are selected as the
winners. Further, after observing previous submissions,
we derive every user best response effort bidding function
for sequential crowd sensing applications with budget
constraints, which influences user participation and sens-
ing data submission quality.
• Extensive simulations show that our proposed incentive
mechanism outperforms the existing solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we briefly discuss the related work and motivation. In
Section III, we present our system model, related definitions
and our design goals. In Section IV, we design a behavior
based incentive strategy for sequential crowd sensing in MSNs,
and present the performance evaluation in Section V. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Extensive user participation and submission quality issues
are two crucial human factors for crowd sensing applications in
MSNs. The authors of [13] proposed recruitment frameworks
to enable the platform to identify well-suited participants for
sensing data collections. However, they only considered the
users’ selection, rather than the incentive mechanism design.
In recent years, most of reported studies have focused on how
to stimulate selfish participants to enhance user participation
levels. For instance, the authors of [7], [8], [10], [14] explored
the extensive user participation to achieve a good sensing
service for crowd sensing applications. Obviously, it is not
practical to assume that the requester in their mechanisms
will always have an unlimited budget. The authors of [5],
[15]–[17] designed an incentive mechanism to enhance user
participation levels under a budget constraint. Although they
designed truthful mechanisms, which optimized the utility
function of the platform under a fixed budget constraint, to
2All-pay auction, is an auction in which every bidder must pay regardless
of whether he wins the prize, which is awarded to the highest bidder as in a
conventional auction.
incentive extensive user participation, the effects of the online
sequential manner, in which users arrive, were neglected. In
practice, recently, there are a few works focusing on both
budget constraints and the online sequential manner of users’
arrival to enhance user participating levels. For instance, the
authors of [18], [19] exploited posted price mechanisms for
stimulating the online arrival user participation. The authors of
[20] leveraged threshold price mechanism for maximizing the
number of tasks under budget constraints and task completion
deadlines. However, they did not consider the submission
quality issue of sensing data.
Compared with the extensive user participation issue, there
are only a handful of research works [11], [12] focusing on
the submission quality issue for crowd sensing applications
in MSNs. These works stimulate participants to submit high
quality sensing data to achieve good service quality, but do not
support the extensive user participation issue. The authors of
[21] study a problem about the low payment from a predefined
number of participants. On the contrary, we focus on the utility
maximum problem with a given budget. In our mechanism,
in order to simultaneously satisfy the requirements of both
extensive user participation and high quality sensing data
submission, we combine the all-pay auction mechanism and a
proportional share allocation rule to achieve the better service
for crowd sensing applications with budget constraints. Fur-
thermore, we account for the online arrival of users and model
the issue as an online sequential all-pay auction. Simulations
indicate that our proposed incentive mechanisms outperform
existing solutions.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider the following crowd sensing system model
illustrated in Fig. 1. The system consists of a crowd sensing
application platform, to which a requester with a budget B > 0
posts a crowd sensing application that resides in the cloud and
consists of multiple sensing servers, and many mobile device
users, which are connected to the cloud by cellular networks
(e.g., GSM/3G/4G) or WiFi connections. The crowd sensing
application first publicizes a sequential sensing task in an Area
of Interest (AoI), denoted by Γ = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}. Assume
that a set of users U = {1, 2, · · · , n} interested in the crowd
sensing service campaign register to the platform, and then
arrive online in a sequential order.
B. User Model
We explore online auctions where each user arriving ran-
domly has a chance to win the auction, and each offering
sensing data such as location information for constructing
network coverage maps, for which each user associate a private
cost ci. The platform has a public (known to the mechanism
designer and maybe known to all agents) budget B ∈ R+,
and a public nondecreasing utility function U over the subsets
of users. We assume that in each time step, a single user
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Fig. 1. Our crowd sensing system framework with all-pay auctions.
appears and the platform makes a decision that is based on the
information it has about the user and the history of the previous
i− 1 stages. Generally, there are three classes of user models:
the i.i.d. model, the secretary model, and the adversarial
model. The first model means that at each time step the
costs and values of users are drawn from some unknown
distributions. The second model means that the users’ costs
are chosen by an adversary, however their arrival order is a
permutation that is drawn uniformly at random from the set of
all possible permutations. In the third model, the users’ costs
and their arrival order are chosen by an adversary. Note that
in the third model, although the adversary cannot observe the
actions the mechanism takes, since it has full knowledge, the
adversary chooses the worst arrival order and costs. Thereby,
the mechanism cannot obtain the optimal solutions. Thus, in
this paper, we only account for the two models with respect
to the distribution of users, described in increasing order of
generality: the i.i.d.model and the secretary model.
C. Problem Formulation
We model the above interactive process between the plat-
form and users as an online sequential all-pay auction with the
budget constraint, where the plethora of users with different
preference and skill ability θ ∈ [θ, θ] (θ and θ denote the least
skilled behavior ability and the most skilled behavior ability
respectively) arrive and compete in a contest by their efforts
in one period. User behavior abilities are described by the
distribution function F . Assume that users are game-theoretic
and seek to make strategy to maximize their individual utility
in equilibrium. Receiving the crowd sensing campaign from
the platform, each user i provides its sensing profile Γi to
the platform according to its preference and skill ability so
as to expect a prize allocation (i.e.,payment) in return for its
sensing data submission. The platform determines the payment
M1,M2, · · · ,Mn to the top n (highest-ranked) submissions in
one period (M1 ≥ M2 ≥ · · · ≥ ML = m > ML+1 = · · · =
Mn = 0,
∑n
l=1Ml = B): the user with the best submission
receives M1, the first runner-up receives M2, and so forth.
Note that different from traditional mechanisms, here Γi is
not fixed. Thereby, the contribution of user i, denoted by ei,
is uncertain and depends on user’s efforts. But when these
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Variable Description
U , n, i set of users, number of users, and some user
B,B
′
, e∗ budget constraint and stage-budget, the effort threshold
T, T
′
, t deadline, end time step of each stage, and each time step
Γi user i’ sensing profile
Γ,m, τj set of services, number of services, and some service
θi, ei, Ui behavior ability, effort bid and marginal utility of user i
S
′
,J set of sampled users and winners in sampled users
L number of users with allocated prizes larger than zero
pi, Fi number of allocated prizes and ability distribution of user i
θ, θ the least skilled and the most skilled behavior ability
Φj order cumulative distribution function of the j-th best type
sensing data are submitted to the platform, the platform can
identify their contributions, i.e., their marginal utility (to be
elaborated later).
More formally, an online mechanism M = (f, p), which
consists of an allocation function f : Rn+ → 2[n] and a
payment function p : Rn+ → Rn+, is needed. That is, for
any random arriving users’ Pˆ = (Γ1,Γ2, · · · ,Γn) strategy
sequence, the allocation function computes an allocation of
the budget for participatory users S′ ⊆ U and the payment
function returns a payment vector to participatory users. Thus,
the utility of user i is pi− eiθi if it is allocated, −
ei
θi
otherwise.
The platform expect to obtain the maximum value from the
particpatory users’ service quality under the budget constraint,
i.e.,
maxU(S
′
) Subject to
∑
i∈S′
pi ≤ B
where U(S′) is the monotone submodular value function of
services from the participatory users S′ . More variables are
given in Table I.
Putting the above online policy together, we design incentive
mechanisms based on users’ behavior abilities to simultane-
ously satisfy the requirements of both extensive user partici-
pation and high quality sensing data submission. To stimulate
users to produce endogenous maximal efforts, we introduce a
sequential all-pay auction to the above online allocation strate-
gies for our incentive mechanism design. Considering a risk-
neutral budget constrained all-pay auctions, the above utility
function U(S′) indicates that U(e1, · · · , eL) =
∑
i∈S′ f(ei),
where the effort f(ei) is equal to the marginal utility of user
i, i.e., f(ei) = Ui(S
′
) = U(S
′
∪ {i})− U(S
′
) when the set
of sampled users is S′ .
Generally speaking, the goal of the platform is to select a
subset S with the size L that maximizes the total efforts of the
users under the given budget. A utility-maximizing platform
should select the number of prizes L, the total prize budget B
and the allocation of prizes M1+M2+ · · ·+ML = B which
maximizes the platform’s utility U(e1, · · · , eL, B). More gen-
erally, given a budget B and a reserved effort m, finding a
subset S, is equivalent to maximizing the above coverage issue
of sensing data submitted by users.
A case study: We consider the following scenario where the
platform expects to obtain the sensing data covering all roads
in an AoI. For convenience of presentations and calculations,
we divide each road in the AoI into multiple discrete points,
and the objective of the platform is equivalent to receiving the
submitted sensing data covering all points before T . The set
of all points in the AOI is denoted by Γ = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}.
The set of points submitted by user i is denoted by Γi
(called user i’s sensing profile), which are the result of users’
efforts based on their behavior ability. For ease of presentation,
assume that each point τj needs to be sensed at most one
time. The value of the sampled users to the platform is:
U(S
′
) =
m∑
j=1
min
{
1,
∑
i∈S′ si,j
}
, where si,j equals to 1 if
τi ∈ Γi, 0 otherwise.
IV. OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE SENSING
CONTEST
In this section, we present an online contest mechanism for
achieving extensive user participation and stimulating users
to submit high quality sensing data. To this end, we adopt
a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process for guaranteeing
extensive user participation. Then we introduce an online
sequential all-pay auction for stimulating users to submit high
quality sensing data.
A. Incentive Mechanism Design
An online contest mechanism needs to overcome several
nontrivial challenges. First, the users’ effort bids are unknown
and need to be elicited in a truthful reporting manner. Second,
the total prizes cannot exceed the platform’s budget; Thirdly,
the mechanism needs to tackle the online arrival of the users
and makes irrevocable decisions on whether to allocate the
number of prizes; Finally, and most important, the mechanism
needs to cope with strategic users’ endogenous efforts. To
achieve good service quality, previous online solutions and
generalized secretary problems [20], [22]–[24] is via sampling:
the first batch of the input is rejected and used as a sample
which enables making an informed decision on the rest of the
users. However, since users are likely to be discouraged to
sense data knowing the pricing mechanism will automatically
reject their effort bid. In other words, those users arriving
early have no incentive to report their bids to the platform,
which may delay the users’ completion or even lead to task
starvation. On the other hand, the above mechanisms only
apply for fixed services submitted by each user, thereby neglect
users’ endogenous efforts.
To address the above challenges, we adopt a multiple-
stage sampling-allocating process to design our online contest
incentive mechanism. At each stage, based on the above
submodularity, the mechanism maintains a effort threshold
which is used to decide to allocate the number of the users’
prizes. The mechanism dynamically increases the sample size
and learns a budget that are enough to allocate users for
maximizing the total utility, then apply this density threshold
for making further allocation decisions.
1 2 3
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a multi-stage sample process with deadlines T .
(a)Budget B′ versus quantile qi; (b)Quantile qi versus time t.
Specifically, given a distribution on the arrival of users,
we can easily calculate every time step t s.t. the proba-
bility that a user arrives before t is 1/2i. All of T time
steps are divided into 2i quantiles: {0, 1, · · · , ⌈logT ⌉}. We
apply S′ to denote the set of all sampled users until the
time step t. Our mechanism (see Algorithm 1) iterates over
qi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ⌈logT ⌉} and at every time step qi, a budget
of B/2i is applied to allocate the number of prizes (illustrated
in Fig. 2). Firstly, when a new user i arrives, with probability
1/3, our mechanism computes the best response effort bid of
user i according to his current behavior ability, and thereby
can submit its sensing data as a result of his efforts. Receiving
user i’s sensing data Γi, regardless of whether it is given
prizes, it is added to the sample set S′ due to the nature
of the all-pay auction. Given a set of sampled users S′ ,
the platform computes the marginal utility of user i, i.e.,
Ui(S
′
) = U(S
′
∪ {i}) − U(S
′
), i /∈ S
′
. The mechanism
allocates prizes to user i as long as the minimal prizes of
the last offline sample stage is not larger than the result of
effort threshold e (to be elaborated in the following subsection)
multiplied by the marginal utility Ui(S), and the allocated
stage-budget B′ has not been exhausted. At the first stage,
we set a small effort threshold and minimal prizes to start
our mechanism. The randomization addresses extreme cases in
which only a single user with the strongest behavior abilities
can complete a large fraction of the crowd sensing application
at the threshold efforts. This is the result that an incentive
compatible variant of Dynkin’s celebrated algorithm [25] to
the issue of hiring the best secretary, is tailored to our setting.
To make the above mechanism to achieve our goal, in the
following, we elaborate the computation methods of the effort
threshold and the arrival user’s optimal sequential efforts.
B. Threshold Effort Decision
In this subsection, we first introduce a threshold effort
to ensure the extensive participation. Then we apply all-
pay auction to enhance users’ submission quality. We now
turn to the following definition of nondecreasing submodular
functions used in our pricing mechanisms.
Definition 1 (Submodular Function): Let N be a finite
set, a function U : 2U → R (the set of reals) is submodular if
U(S ∪ {i}) − U(S) ≥ U(S
′
∪ {i}) − U(S
′
), ∀S ⊆ S
′
⊆ U ,
where S, S′ , and U are illustrated in Table I, and i denotes
some user.
Background: Submodularity, a discrete analog of convex-
ity, has played an essential role in combinatorial optimization
[26]. It appears in many important settings and almost every-
where [27] including cuts in graphs [28]–[30], rank function of
Algorithm 1 The Budgeted Behavior-based incentive mecha-
nism under Sequential all-pay auctions(BBS)
Input: Budget constraint R, deadlines T
1: (T
′
, B
′
, S
′
, e∗,M∗, t) ← ( T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, B
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, ε, ν, 1);
2: for t ≤ T do
3: if there is a user i arriving at time step t then
4: With probability 1/3 do:
5: Exert the effort ei for user i obtained according to
his behavior abilities by using the expression (2) and
submit its sensing data Γi as its effort result to the
platform;
6: Receiving these data Γi, the platform computes the
marginal utility of user i, i.e., Ui(S
′
);
7: if M∗ ≤ e∗ · Ui(S
′
) ≤ B
′
−
∑
j∈S pj then
8: pi ← e · Ui(S
′
);
9: end if
10: S
′
← S
′
∪ {i};
11: Otherwise do:
12: for the first user i arriving by ⌊T ′⌋ do
13: Run Dynkin’s algorithm and offer B the winner;
14: end for
15: end if
16: if t = ⌊T ′⌋ then
17: Calculate (e∗,M∗)=GetEffortThreshold(S′, 2B′);
18: set B
′
← 2B
′
, T
′
← 2T
′
;
19: end if
20: t← t+ 1;
21: end for
matroids [31], set covering problems and plant location prob-
lems [32]. In many settings such as set covering or matroid
optimization, the relevant submodular functions are monotone,
meaning that U(S) ≤ U(S′) whenever S ⊆ S′ . More recently
submodular functions have become key concepts both in the
machine learning and algorithmic game theory communities.
For example, submodular functions have been used to model
bidders’ valuation functions in combinatorial auctions [33]–
[35], and for solving feature selection problems in graphical
models [36] or for solving various clustering problems [37].
Lemma 1: The value function U(S) is monotone submod-
ular.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix.
In a general submodular maximization problem, a propor-
tional share allocation rule is a natural fit to compute the
effort threshold (see Algorithm 2) due to its monotonicity
when users are sorted according to their efforts relative to
increasing marginal contributions. However, to enhance the
sensing data quality (users’ efforts), we apply the optimal
winning participant number L and the optimal prize amounts
Mi(i ∈ {1, · · · , L}) to calculate the effort threshold of the
next time step. The optimal winning participant number L
and the optimal prize amounts Mi(i ∈ {1, · · · , L}) can
be calculated according to the method in [38]. Then, these
sampled users are sorted according to increasing marginal
Algorithm 2 GetEffortThreshold
Input: Sample set S′ , stage budget constraint B′
Output: Effort threshold and minimal prizes, i.e., (e,ML).
1: Compute the optimal winners’ number and the optimal
prize amounts Mi(i ∈ {1, · · · , L});
2: Sort their marginal utility relative to their prize amounts,
s.t. U1/M1 ≥ U2/M2 ≥ · · · ≥ UL/ML; set k = 1;
3: The winner set J ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈X ′ (Uj(J )/Mj);
4: while k ≤ L and Mi ≤ UiB
′
/U(J ∪ i) do
5: J ← J ∪ i;
6: i← argmaxj∈S′\J (Uj(J )/Mj);
7: k ← k + 1;
8: end while
9: e← B
′
/U(J );
10: return (e,ML);
contributions relative to their prize amounts. This sorting
implies:
U1/M1 ≥ U2/M2 ≥ · · · ≥ UL/ML,
where Ui denotes Ui|S′
i−1
= (U(S
′
i−1 ∪ {i}) − U(S
′
i−1)),
S
′
i−1 = {1, 2, · · · , i− 1}, and S
′
0 = ∅. The specifical iteration
process is illustrated in Algorithm 2 to guarantee the extensive
user participation.
C. Computing Sequential Efforts
In the following subsection, due to space limitations, assum-
ing that the reserved value m is zero, i.e., e0 = 0, we derive
the equilibrium effort bidding function for sequential all-pay
auction arrival users. For the positive reserve case, e0 > 0, the
similar results can also be derived, which will be discussed in
our future work.
For technical reasons, we assume that ties are broken in
favor of the late entrant 3 so as to illicit the truthful effort bid
of the current user. For user i, a submission of quality ei costs
ei/θi, indicating that it is less costly for a high ability user
to submit a sensing data of a given quality than a low ability
user. Assume that Φj is the cumulative distribution function
of the j-th best type out of n−1 users. According to equation
(2.1.3) of [39], we have
Φj(e) =
n−1∑
i=1
(
n− 1
i
)
Φ(e)i(1− Φ(e))n−1−i.
Moreover, the expected utility V of the user of ability
type θ bidding with quality e is V =
L∑
l=1
Φj(e)(Ml −Ml+1).
Thus, applying backward induction iteratively for user n, n−
1, · · · , i+1, we can obtain the following maximization prob-
lem of the just arrival user i:
3This is a technical assumption to derive strict subgame perfect equilibria
instead of ǫ-equilibria.
max
ei
{V
n∏
j=i+1
Fj(ej = 0)−
ei
θi
}
s.t. ei ≥ eL−th(θL−th),
(1)
where eL−th(θL−th) denotes the L-th largest effort bids ob-
served by user i.
Therefore, in the following, we derive user i’s best re-
sponse effort bidding function based on the assumption that
the behavior ability distribution function is F (x) = xc,
where 0 < c < 1 like [9], [40]. To derive a closed-form
solution, we therefore restrict attention to the specific fam-
ily of concave distribution functions, for which we are
able to explicitly calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium
eort of each contestant. This will allow us to derive some
general optimal results on multi-stage sequential all pay
auctions. If we let
←−
θi = [(1− dL−th)θL−th]di/dL−th , and−→
θi = [(1− d1−th)θ1−th]
di/d1−th/c, given e1, e2, · · · , ei−1,
user i’s best response effort bidding function is obtained
as follows (the complete calculation process given in the
Appendix):
ei =


0 0 ≤ θi <
←−
θi
{ej−th(θj−th)}j∈{1,2,··· ,L}
←−
θi ≤ θi <
−→
θi
V [θi(1 − di)]1/di
−→
θi ≤ θi ≤ 1
(2)
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our BBS mechanism,
and explore the effects of extensive user participation and
high quality sensing data submission for real crowd sensing
applications, we implement the mechanism by applying the
well-known Manhattan model obtained from the Google Map,
which is the same as [41].
A. Experimental Setup
In the simulation, the sensing range of each mobile phone
is set to 7 meters. The AoI obtained from the Google Map is
located at Manhattan, NY, which spans 4 blocks from west to
east with a total length of 1.135km and 4 blocks from south to
north with a total width of 0.319km, and includes 3 Avenues
and 3 Streets. We divide each road in the AoI into multiple
discrete AoIs with a uniform spacing of 1 meter, so the AoI
consists of 1135 ∗ 3+319 ∗ 3− 9 = 4353 PoIs in total, where
each Avenue has 1135 points and each Street has 319 points,
and the crossing of Avenues and Streets includes 9 points.
Data sensing area sizes are set at random. In summary, we
used 1887 sensing data packets from different locations via
200 different users [41]. The sensing range (behavior ability)
of different users’ sensor changes from 3 meters to 10 meters.
To start the mechanism, we initially set the effort threshold e∗
and the number of minimal prizes M∗ of Algorithm 1 are set
to 0.1. Users arrive according to a Poisson process in time with
arrival rate λ, which varies from 0.3 to 8 with the increment
of 0.1. Arriving at our scenario, some user is placed randomly
at some location on the AoI’s roads. All measurements are
averaged over 30 sensing tasks. Our primary goals are to
evaluate the performance of the online mechanism on real
effort bids as well as to test users’ participating response to
different mechanisms.
B. Threshold Evolution of Different Mechanisms
To test the performance of our BBS mechanism, we use
the users’ effort bids from all-pay auctions and compare our
mechanism against several benchmarks. Note that in order
to show how many users can be accepted to participate in
the crowd sensing given a specified budget, we only need to
computing the values of users’ best response effort bidding
function, which is practically obtained according to the users’
arrival sequence. We compare our BBS mechanism against two
benchmarks. One has full knowledge about users’ costs, and
the other is the GetEffortThreshold procedure applied offline.
We simulate these algorithms on different budgets to examine
the change in the threshold efforts as the number of users
increases in the sample. In all simulations, we observe that
the threshold efforts converged quickly. Fig. 3(a) shows that
the value of the threshold efforts changes with the stage of
the mechanism (the number of users that submitted their effort
bids) on the logarithmic scale. As we can see, the threshold
efforts quickly stabilize and remain almost constant throughout
the running.
C. Effects of User Participation
To examine whether users perform strategic considerations
in their prizing mechanisms, we can observe the distinct
difference between the plots of the different total efforts (bids)
in Fig. 3(b) based on different mechanisms. Most of users
in the Winner-Take-All scheme, where a single winner gets
all prizes, drop out of the contest, since the probability of
winning the crowd sensing contest decreased with number
of participants. Users in the Multiple-Winners scheme, where
multiple winners get the same prizes, exert lower effort when
there are larger number of participants. In the reverse auction,
bidders accepted in the best possible scheme increase their
bids. (The following drops off since we enforce the budget
constraint). In the best incentive compatible schemes, bids
are lowered, since users bids are rejected. We believe that
this is a strong support for persisting in incentive compatible
mechanisms, since they think that this will increase their
profit. Interestingly, our BBS scheme solves both incentive
compatibility and individual rationality problems.
D. Effects of Submission Quality
To examine the quality of submission sensing data quality,
we plot the total utility value as a function of different
budgets in Fig. 3(c). In the Winner-Take-All scheme, most
of users drop out of the contest, since the probability of
winning the crowd sensing contest decreases with the number
of participants increasing. Thus, the total utility value would
decreased from its maximum. Users in the Multiple-Winners
scheme, where multiple winners get the same prizes, exert
lower effort and obtain more total utility values when there are
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Fig. 3. (a)The threshold efforts e versus sample stage t; (b)Effects of user participation; (c)Effects of submission quality; (d)The difference of submission
quality.
larger numbers of participants as more budgets are provided.
In the reverse auction, bidders accepted in the best possible
scheme increased their bids. In the following, they drop off
since we enforced the budget constraint. In the best incentive
compatible schemes, bids are lowered, since users bids are
rejected. We believe that this is a strong support for persisting
in incentive compatible mechanisms, since they think that this
will increase their total utilities. Interestingly, our BBS scheme
solves both IR and IC problems, therefore, it ensures extensive
user participation and high quality sensing data submission,
just as illustrated in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c).
Furthermore, we also quantify submission quality by con-
sidering users’ mean differences from true on-site data over
their effort bids. Fig. 3(d) indicates that our BBS mechanism
has a lower mean errors than the proportional share allocation
rule.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a behavior based incentive strategy
to motivate users to exert the most sensing effort according
to their behavior abilities and willingness for practical crowd
sensing applications. We assess the participants’ efforts ac-
cording to their context situation (e.g., sensing location and
sensing time). We believe that sequential all-pay auctions in
our proposed framework provide a good basis for real crowd
sensing applications. Future research could expand on our BBS
mechanism by studying the effects of privacy protection on
participation level and submission quality. A natural extension
of this scheme may be desirable to have submissions privacy
protected and to hide user experience level or identity.
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APPDENX
Proof of Lemma 1:
From the previous case, we know U(S) =
m∑
j=1
min
{
1,
∑
i∈S si,j
}
. For ∀S ⊆ S
′
⊆ U and k ∈ U \ S′ ,
we have
U(S ∪ {k})− U(S) =
m∑
j=1
min
{
max{0, 1−
∑
i∈S
si,j}, sk,j
}
≥
m∑
j=1
min

max{0, 1−
∑
i∈S′
si,j}, sk,j


= U(S
′
∪ {k})− U(S
′
)
Besides, for ∀S ⊆ U and k ∈ U \ S, we have U(S ∪ {k})−
U(S) ≥ 0. Thus, U(S) is monotone submodular. Thereby the
Lemma 1 holds.
Proof of User i Bidding Function:
In the following, we derive user i’s best response effort bidding
function based on the assumption that the behavior ability
distribution function is F (x) = xc, where 0 < c < 1 like [9],
[40]. Applying backward induction, we expect that user n will
win the auction if the quality of her solution is higher than
or equal to the best quality submission among all previous
submissions, max {ej(θj)}j<n, and if her ability is sufficiently
high, θn ≥ 1V max {ej(θj)}j<n. If her ability is not high
enough, i.e., θn < 1V max {ej(θj)}j<n, then her benefit from
winning (V ) is less than her bidding cost. In this case, she
should bid zero. Likewise, if he bids zero, indicating that his
ability is not high enough, i.e., θn < 1V max {ej(θj)}j<n. On
the other hand, user n−1 wins the all-pay auction conditional
on her submitting sensing data with quality at least as high as
the best previous submission. Thus, max {ej(θj)}j<n = en−1
holds. Putting these together, we have: if user n bids zero,
his ability must be not high enough, i.e., θn < en−1V . In
other words, Fn(en = 0) = Fn(θn < en−1V ) = (
en−1
V
)c
holds. Likewise, for user i + 1, we have Fi+1(ei+1 = 0) =
( ei
V
)c holds. Applying backward induction, iteratively for user
n, n− 1, · · · , i+ 1, we can obtain the following equation.
n∏
j=i+1
Fj(ej = 0)
= [ ei
V
]c(1−c)
n−(n−(i+1))
[ ei
V
]c(1−c)
n−(n−(i+2))
· · · [ ei
V
]c
= [ ei
V
]1−(1−c)
n−i
Since the constraint is not binding, the above equation is fed
into equation (1) to compute the first-order condition, thereby,
ei is obtained by:
[1− (1− c)n−i][
ei
V
]−(1−c)
n−i
−
1
θi
= 0.
The second-order condition is obtained by:
−
1
V
{(1− c)n−i(1− (1 − c)n−i)[
ei
V
]−(1−c)
n−i
} < 0
Thus, the interior solution is ei(θi) = V [θi(1 −
(1 − c)n−i)]
1
(1−c)n−i
. Let di = (1 − c)n−i. The inte-
rior solution is rewritten as ei(θi) = V [θi(1 − di)]
1
di .
Therefore, if we let
←−
θi = [(1− dL−th)θL−th]di/dL−th , and−→
θi = [(1 − d1−th)θ1−th]di/d1−th/c, given e1, e2, · · · , ei−1,
user i’s best response effort bidding function, i.e. the previous
expression (2) holds evidently.
